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Abstract—Location-based services (LBSs) have become widely
popular. Despite their utility, these services raise concerns for
privacy since they require sharing location information with
untrusted third parties. In this work, we study privacy-utility
trade-off in location sharing mechanisms. Existing approaches
are mainly focused on privacy of sharing a single location
or myopic location trace privacy; neither of them taking into
account the temporal correlations between the past and current
locations. Although these methods preserve the privacy for the
current time, they may leak significant amount of information
at the trace level as the adversary can exploit temporal cor-
relations in a trace. We propose an information theoretically
optimal privacy preserving location release mechanism that takes
temporal correlations into account. We measure the privacy
leakage by the mutual information between the user’s true and
released location traces. To tackle the history-dependent mutual
information minimization, we reformulate the problem as a
Markov decision process (MDP), and solve it using asynchronous
actor-critic deep reinforcement learning (RL).
I. INTRODUCTION
Fast advances in mobile devices and positioning technolo-
gies have fostered the development of many location-based
services (LBSs), such as Google Maps, Uber, Forsquare and
Tripadvisor. These services provide users with useful informa-
tion about their surroundings, transportation services, friends’
activities, or nearby attraction points. Moreover, the integration
of LBSs with social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, has rapidly increased indirect location sharing, e.g.,
via image or video sharing. However, location is one of the
most sensitive private information for users, since a malicious
adversary can use this information to derive users’ habits,
health condition, social relationships, or religion. Therefore,
location trace privacy has been an important concern in LBSs,
and there is an increasing pressure from consumers to keep
their traces private against malicious attackers or untrusted
service providers (SPs), while preserving the utility obtained
from these applications.
A large body of research has focused on location-privacy
protection mechanisms (LPPMs) against an untrusted service
provider [1]. These methods can be categorized as spatial-
location and temporal-location privacy preserving methods [2].
While the former focuses on protecting a single location data
[3]–[7], the latter aims at providing location trace privacy [8]–
[10]. Individual locations on a trace are highly correlated, and
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the strategies focusing on the current location privacy might
reveal sensitive information about the past or future locations.
Differential privacy, k-anonymity and information theoretic
metrics are commonly used as privacy measures [3]–[10]. By
definition, differential privacy prevents the service provider
from inferring the current location of the user, even if the SP
has the knowledge of all the remaining locations. K-anonymity
ensures that a location is indistinguishable from at least k −
1 other location points. However, differential privacy and k-
anonymity are meant to ensure the privacy of a single location,
and they are shown not to be appropriate measures for location
privacy in [11]. Instead, we treat the true and released location
traces as random sequences, and measure the privacy leakage
by mutual information [12].
In [7], the authors introduce location distortion mechanisms
to keep the user’s trajectory private. Privacy is measured
by mutual information between the true and released traces
and constrained by the average distortion for a specific
distortion measure. The true trajectory is assumed to form
a Markov chain. Due to the computational complexity of
history-dependent mutual information optimization, authors
propose bounds which take only the current and one step past
locations into account. However, due to temporal correlations
in the trajectory, the optimal distortion introduced at each time
instance depends on the entire distortion and location history.
Hence, the proposed bounds do not guarantee optimality.
In this work, we consider the scenario in which the user
follows a trajectory generated by a first-order Markov process,
and periodically reports a distorted version of her location
to an untrusted service provider. We assume that the true
locations become available to the user in an online manner.
We use the mutual information between the true and distorted
location traces as a measure of privacy loss. For the privacy-
utility trade-off, we introduce an online LPPM minimizing
the mutual information while keeping the distortion below
a certain threshold. Unlike [7], we consider location release
policies which take the entire released location history into
account, and show its optimality. To tackle the complexity,
we exploit the Markovity of the true user trajectory, and
recast the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP).
After identifying the structure of the optimal policy, we use
advantage actor-critic (A2C) deep reinforcement learning (RL)
framework as a tool to evaluate our continuous state and action
space MDP numerically.
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II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a user who shares her location with a service
provider to gain utility through some LBS. We denote the
true location of the user at time t by Xt ∈ W , where W is
the finite set of possible locations. We assume that the user
trajectory {Xt}t≥1 follows a first-order time-homogeneous
Markov chain with transition probabilities qx(xt+1|xt), and
initial probability distribution px1 . At time t, the user shares a
distorted version of her current location, denoted by Yt ∈ W ,
with the untrusted service provider due to privacy concerns.
We assume that the user shares the distorted location in an
online manner; that is, the released location at time t does not
depend on the future true locations; i.e., for any 1 < t < n,
Yt → (Xt, Y t−1) → (Xnt+1, Y nt+1) form a Markov chain,
where we have denoted the sequence (Xt+1, . . . , Xn) by
Xnt+1, and the sequence (X1, . . . , Xt) by X
t.
Our goal is to characterize the trade-off between the privacy
and utility. We quantify privacy by the information leaked
to the untrusted service provider, measured by the mutual
information between the true and released location trajectories.
The information leakage of the user’s location release strategy
for a time period n is given by
I(Xn;Y n) =
n∑
t=1
I(Xn;Yt|Y t−1) =
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Yt|Y t−1), (1)
where the first equality follows from the chain rule of mutual
information, and the second from the Markov chain Y t →
(Xt, Y
t−1)→ Xnt+1.
Releasing distorted locations also reduces the utility re-
ceived from the service provider. Therefore, the distortion
applied by the user should be limited. The distortion between
the true location Xt and the released location Yt is measured
by a specified distortion measure d(Xt, Yt) (e.g., Manhattan
distance or Euclidean distance).
Our goal is to minimize the information leakage rate to the
service provider while keeping the average distortion below
a specified level for utility. The infinite-horizon optimization
problem can be written as:
min
{qt(yt|xt,yt−1)}∞t=1
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
Iq(Xt;Yt|Y t−1) (2)
such that lim
n→∞E
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
d(Xt, Yt)
]
≤ D¯, (3)
where D¯ is the specified average distortion constraint on the
utility loss, xt and yt represent the realizations of Xt and
Yt, qt(yt|xt, yt−1) is a conditional probability distribution
which represents the user’s randomized location release policy
at time t. The expectation in (3) is taken over the joint
probabilities of Xt and Yt, where the randomness stems from
both the Markov process generating the true trajectory, and
the random release mechanism qt(yt|xt, yt−1). The mutual
information induced by policy qt(yt|xt, yt−1) is calculated
using the joint probability distribution
P q(Xn = xn, Y n = yn) = px1q1(y1|x1)
×
n∏
t=2
[
qx(xt|xt−1)qt(yt|xt, yt−1)
]
, (4)
where q = {qt(yt|xt, yt−1)}nt=1. In the next section, we
characterize the structure of the optimal location release policy,
and using this structure recast the problem as an MDP, and
finally evaluate the optimal trade-off numerically using deep
RL.
III. PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADE-OFF FOR
ONLINE LOCATION SHARING
In this section, we analyze the optimal privacy-utility trade-
off achievable by an LPPM under the notion of mutual
information minimization with a distortion constraint. More-
over, we propose simplified location release policies that still
preserve the optimality.
By the definition of mutual information, the objective in
(2) depends on the entire history of X and Y . Therefore,
the user must follow a history-dependent location release
policy qht (yt|xt, yt−1), where a feasible set QH satisfies∑
yt∈W q
h
t (yt|xt, yt−1) = 1. As a result of strong history
dependence, computational complexity of the minimization
problem increases exponentially with the increasing length of
user trajectory. To tackle this problem, we introduce a class
of simplified policies.
A. Simplified Location Release Policies
In this section we introduce a set of policies QS ⊆ QH
of the form qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1), which samples the distorted
location only by considering the last two true locations and the
entire released location history. Hence, the joint distribution (4)
induced by qs ∈ QS , where qs = {qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)}nt=1
can be written as
P qs(Xn =xn, Y n = yn) = px1q
s
1(y1|x1)
×
n∏
t=2
[
qx(xt|xt−1)qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)
]
. (5)
Next, we show that considering location release policies in
set QS is without loss of optimality.
Theorem 1. In the minimization problem (2), there is no loss
of optimality in restricting the location release policies to the
set of policies qs ∈ QS . Furthermore, information leakage
induced by any qs ∈ QS can be written as:
Iqs(Xn, Y n) =
n∑
t=1
Iqs(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1) (6)
=
n∑
t=1
∑
yt∈Wt
(xt,xt−1)∈W
P qs(xt, xt−1, yt) log
qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)
P qs(yt|yt−1) . (7)
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following lemmas and
will be presented later.
Lemma 1. For any q ∈ QH ,
Iq(Xn;Y n) ≥
n∑
t=1
Iq(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1) (8)
with equality if and only if q ∈ QS .
Proof: For any q ∈ QH ,
Iq(Xn;Y n) =
n∑
t=1
Iq(Xt;Yt|Y t−1) (9)
≥
n∑
t=1
Iq(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1), (10)
where (9) follows from (1), and (10) from the non-negativity
of mutual information.
Lemma 2. For any qh ∈ QH , there exists a qs ∈ QS such
that
n∑
t=1
Iqh(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1) =
n∑
t=1
Iqs(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1).
(11)
Proof: For any qh ∈ QH , we choose the policy qs ∈ QS
such that
qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)=P qhYt|Xt,Xt−1,Y t−1(yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1),
(12)
and we show that P qhXt,Xt−1,Y t = P
qs
Xt,Xt−1,Y t . Then,
Iqh(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1) = Iqs(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1) holds,
which proves the statement in Lemma 2. The proof of
P
qh
Xt,Xt−1,Y t=P
qs
Xt,Xt−1,Y t is derived by induction as follows,
P qh(xt+1, xt, y
t)
=
∑
xt−1∈W
qx(xt+1|xt)qht (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)P qh(xt, xt−1, yt−1)
=
∑
xt−1∈W
qx(xt+1|xt)qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)P qs(xt, xt−1, yt−1)
= P qs(xt+1, xt, y
t), (13)
where (12) holds, and P qhX1(x) = px1(x) = P
qs
X1
(x) is for the
initialization of the induction.
Proof of Theorem 1: Following Lemmas 1 and 2, for any
qh ∈ QH , there exists a qs ∈ QS such that
Iqh(Xn;Y n) ≥ Iqs(Xn;Y n). (14)
Hence, there is no loss of optimality in using the location
release policies of the form qst (yt, |xt, xt−1, yt−1), and infor-
mation leakage reduces to (7).
Restricting our attention to the user location release policies
qs ∈ QS , we can write the minimization problem (2) as
min
qs:{Eqs [d(xt,yt)]≤D¯}ni=1
1
n
n∑
t=1
Iqs(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1). (15)
The location release strategy followed by the user is il-
lustrated by the Markov chain in Fig. 1, where Ht denotes
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Fig. 1: Markov chain for the simplified location release policy.
the released location history, i.e., Ht = Y t. That is, the user
samples a distorted location, Yt, at time t by considering the
current and previous true locations, (Xt, Xt−1), and released
location history, (Ht−2, Yt−1).
Minimization of the mutual information subject to a utility
constraint can be converted into an unconstrained minimiza-
tion problem using Lagrange multipliers. Since the distortion
constraint is memoryless, we can integrate it into the additive
objective function easily. Hence, the unconstrained minimiza-
tion problem for online location release privacy-utility trade-
off can be rewritten as
min
qs∈Qs
1
n
n∑
t=1
Iqs(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Y t−1) + λ(Eqs [d(xt, yt)]− D¯).
(16)
B. MDP Formulation
Markovity of the user’s true location trace and the additive
objective function in (16) allow us to represent the problem as
an MDP with state Xt. However, the information leakage at
time t depends on Y t−1, resulting in a growing state space in
time. Therefore, for a given policy qs and any realization y
t−1
of Y t−1, we define a belief state βt ∈ PX as a probability
distribution over the state space:
βt(xt−1) = P qs(Xt−1 = xt−1|Y t−1 = yt−1). (17)
This represents the service provider’s belief on the user’s
true location at the beginning of time instance t, i.e., after
receiving the distorted location yt−1 at the end of the pre-
vious time instance t − 1. The MDP actions are defined as
the probability distributions sampling the released location
Yt = yt at time t, and determined by the randomized location
release policies. The user’s action induced by a policy qs
can be denoted by at(yt|xt, xt−1) = P qs(Yt = yt|Xt =
xt, Xt−1, βt) [13]–[15]. At each time t, the service provider
updates its belief on the true location βt+1(xt) after observing
the distorted location yt by
βt+1(xt) =
p(xt, yt|yt−1)
p(yt|yt−1) =
∑
xt−1 p(xt, xt−1, yt|yt−1)∑
xt,xt−1 p(xt, xt−1, yt|yt−1)
=
∑
xt−1 p(xt|xt−1)qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)p(xt−1|yt−1)∑
xt,xt−1 p(xt|xt−1)qst (yt|xt, xt−1, yt−1)p(xt−1|yt−1)
=
∑
xt−1 qx(xt|xt−1)a(yt|xt, xt−1)βt(xt−1)∑
xt,xt−1 qx(xt|xt−1)a(yt|xt, xt−1)βt(xt−1)
. (18)
We define per-step information leakage of the user due to
taking action at(yt|xt, xt−1) at time t as,
lt(xt, xt−1, at, yt; qs) := log
at(yt|xt, xt−1)
P qs(yt|yt−1) . (19)
The expectation of n step sum of (19) over the joint prob-
ability P qs(Xt, Xt−1, Y t) is equal to the mutual information
expression in the original problem (15). Therefore, given belief
and action probabilities, average information leakage at time
t can be formulated as,
Eqs [lt(xtt−1,at, yt)]=
∑
xt,xt−1,yt∈W
βt(xt−1)at(yt|xt, xt−1)qx(xt|xt−1)
× log at(yt|xt, xt−1)∑
xˆt,xˆt−1∈W
βt(xˆt−1)at(yt|xˆt, xˆt−1)qx(xˆt|xˆt−1)
:= L(βt, at). (20)
We remark that the representation of average distortion in
terms of belief and action probabilities is straightforward due
to its additive form. Similarly to (20), average distortion at
time t can be written as,
Eqs [d(xt, yt)]=
∑
xt,xt−1,yt∈W
βt(xt−1)at(yt|xt, xt−1)qx(xt|xt−1)d(xt, yt)
:= D(βt, at) (21)
Finally, we can recast the original problem in (16) as a
continuous state and action space MDP. Evaluation of the
MDP relies on minimizing the objective
C(βt, at) = L(βt, at) + λ(D(βt, at)− D¯) (22)
at each time step t for a trajectory of length n.
Finding optimal policies for continuous state and action
space MDPs is a PSPACE-hard problem [16]. In practice,
they can be solved by various finite-state MDP evaluation
methods, e.g., value iteration, policy iteration and gradient-
based methods. These are based on the discretization of the
continuous belief states to obtain a finite state MDP [17].
While finer discretization of the belief reduces the loss from
the optimal solution, it causes an increase in the state space;
hence, in the complexity of the problem. Therefore, we use a
deep learning based method as a tool to numerically solve our
continuous state and action space MDP problem.
C. Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) Deep RL
In RL, an agent discovers the best action to take in a
particular state by receiving instantaneous rewards/costs from
the environment [18]. On the other hand, in our problem,
we have the knowledge of state transitions and the cost for
every state-action pair without a need for interacting with the
environment. We use A2C-deep RL as a computational tool to
numerically evaluate the optimal location release policies for
our continuous state and action space MDP.
To integrate RL framework into our problem, we create an
artificial environment which inputs the user’s current action,
at(yt|xt, xt−1), samples an observation yt, and calculates the
next state, βt+1, using Bayesian belief update (18). Instanta-
neous cost revealed by the environment is calculated by (22).
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Fig. 2: RL for a known model.
The user receives the experience tuple (βt, at, yt, βt+1, Ct)
from the environment, and refines her policy accordingly. Fig.
2 illustrates the interaction between the artificial environment
and the user, which is represented by the RL agent. The cor-
responding Bellman equation induced by the location release
policy qs can be written as
V qs(β) + J(qs) = min
a
{
C(β, a) + V qs(β′)
}
, (23)
where V qs(β) is the state-value function, β′ is the updated
belief state according to (18), a represents action probability
distributions, and J(qs) is the cost-to-go function, i.e., the
expected future cost induced by policy qs [19].
RL methods can be divided into three groups: value-based,
policy-based, and actor-critic [20]. Actor-critic methods com-
bine the advantages of value-based (critic-only) and policy-
based (actor-only) methods, such as low variance and con-
tinuous action producing capability. The actor represents the
policy structure, while the critic estimates the value function
[18]. In our setting, we parameterize the value function by the
parameter vector θ ∈ Θ as Vθ(β), and the stochastic policy
by ξ ∈ Ξ as qξ. The difference between the right and the
left hand side of (23) is called temporal difference (TD) error,
which represents the error between the critic’s estimate and
the target differing by one-step in time [21]. The TD error for
the experience tuple (βt, at, yt, βt+1, Ct) is estimated as
δt = Ct(βt) + γVθt(βt+1)− Vθt(βt), (24)
where Ct(βt) + γVθt(βt+1) is called the TD target, and γ is a
discount factor that we choose very close to 1 to approximate
the Bellman equation in (23) for our infinite-horizon average
cost MDP. To implement RL in the infinite-horizon problem,
we take sample averages over independent finite trajectories,
which are generated by experience tuples at each time t via
Monte-Carlo roll-outs.
Instead of using value functions in actor and critic updates,
we use advantage function to reduce the variance in policy
gradient methods. The advantage can be approximated by TD
error. Hence, the critic is updated by gradient descent as:
θt+1 = θt + α
c
t∇θ`c(θt), (25)
where `c(θt) = δ2t is the critic loss and α
c
t is the learning rate
of the critic at time t. The actor is updated similarly as,
ξt+1 = ξt − αat∇ξ`a(ξt), (26)
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Fig. 3: Critic (a) and actor (b) neural network structures.
where `a(ξt) = − ln(qs(yt|βt, ξt))δt is the actor loss and αat
is the actor’s learning rate. This method is called advantage
actor-critic RL.
In our A2C-deep RL implementation, we represent the actor
and critic mechanisms by fully connected feed-forward deep
neural networks (DNNs) with two hidden layers as illustrated
in Fig. 3. The critic DNN takes the current belief state β(X)
as input, where X is the location vector of size |W|, and
outputs the value of the belief state for the current action
probabilities V ξθ (β). The actor takes the belief state as input,
and outputs the parameters used for determining the action
probabilities of the corresponding belief. Here, {ξ1, . . . , ξ|W|}
are the concentration parameters of a Dirichlet distribution
which represent the action probabilities. The overall A2C deep
RL algorithm for online LPPM is described in Algorithm 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
LPPM policy for a simple grid-world example, and compare
the results with the myopic Markovian location release mech-
anism proposed in [7]. In [7], an upper bound on the privacy-
utility trade-off is given by a myopic policy as follows:
n∑
t=1
min
q(yt|xt,xt−1,yt−1):
Eq [d(xt,yt)]≤D¯
Iq(Xt, Xt−1;Yt|Yt−1). (27)
Exploiting the fact that (27) is similar to the rate-distortion
function, Blahut-Arimoto algorithm is used in [7] to minimize
the conditional mutual information at each time step. Finite-
horizon solution of the objective function (27) is obtained by
applying alternating minimization sequentially. In our sim-
ulations, we obtained the average information leakage and
distortion for this approach by normalizing for n = 300.
Algorithm 1: A2C-deep RL algorithm for online LPPM
Initialize the DNNs with random weights ξ and θ
Initialize environment E
for episode=1, N do
Initialize belief state β0;
for t = 0, n do
Sample action probability vector
at ∼ Dirichlet(a|ξ) from the current policy;
Perform the action and calculate cost Cξt in E;
Sample an observation yt and calculate the next
belief state βt+1 in E;
Set TD target Cξt + γV ξθt(βt+1);
Minimize the loss
`c(θ) = δ
2 = (Cξt + γV ξθt(βt+1)− V
ξ
θt
(βt))
2;
Update the critic θ ← θ + αc∇θδ2;
Minimize the loss
`a(ξt) = (ln(Dirichlet(a|ξt))δt);
Update the actor ξ ← ξ − αa∇ξ`a(ξt);
Update the belief state βt+1 ← βt
end
end
We consider a simple 4×4 grid-world, where |W|=16. The
cells are numbered such that the first and the last rows of the
grid-world are represented by {1, 2, 3, 4} and {13, 14, 15, 16},
respectively. User’s trajectory forms a first-order Markov chain
with the transition probability matrix Qx. The user can start its
movement at any square with equal probability px1 =
1
16 . The
Lagrangian multiplier λ ∈ [0, 20] denotes the user’s choice
of privacy-utility balance. We train two fully connected feed-
forward DNNs, representing the actor and critic, by utilizing
ADAM optimizer [22]. Both networks contain two hidden
layers with leaky-ReLU activation [23]. Distortion is measured
by the Manhattan distance between xt and yt. We obtain the
corresponding privacy-utility trade-off by averaging the total
information leakage and distortion over a horizon of n = 300.
In Fig. 4, privacy-distortion trade-off curves are obtained
assuming that Q0x, Q
1
x and Q
2
x are 16× 16 Markov transition
matrices with different correlation levels. In all three cases,
the user can move from any square to any square at each step.
While all the transition probabilities are equal, i.e. 1|W| , for
Q0x, the probability of the user moving to a closer square
is greater than taking a larger step to a more distant one
for Q1x and Q
2
x. Moreover, Q
1
x represents a more uniform
trajectory, where the agent moves to equidistant cells with
equal probability, while with Q2x the agent is more likely to
follow a certain path, i.e., the random trajectory generated by
Q2x has lower entropy. The transition probabilities with Q
1
x
are given by:
qx(xt|xt+1) =
rd(xt,xt+1)/d(xt, xt+1)∑
xt+1
rd(xt,xt+1)/d(xt, xt+1)
, (28)
where d(xt, xt+1) is the Manhattan distance between the user
positions at time t and t+1; rd(xt,xt+1) is a scalar which deter-
mines the probability of the user moving from one grid to the
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Fig. 4: Average information leakage as a function of the av-
erage distortion for the myopic and proposed LPPM policies.
equidistant grids in the next step. Fig. 4 is obtained by setting
r0 = 1 and ri = 7 − i, i = 1, . . . , 6. Furthermore, we gen-
erate Q2x such that qx(xt|xt+1) = u(xt,xt+1)/d(xt,xt+1)∑
xt+1
u(xt,xt+1)/d(xt,xt+1)
,
where, for xt ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 15},
u(xt, xt+1)=

r1, for mod(xt, 4) 6= 0, xt+1 = xt + 1
r1, for mod(xt, 4) = 0, xt+1 = xt + 4,
r0, otherwise,
u(16, xt+1) = r0 for xt+1 ∈ {1, . . . , 15}, and u(16, 16) =
r1. As a result, temporal correlations in the location history
increase in the order Q0x, Q
1
x, Q
2
x.
We train our DNNs for a time horizon of n = 300 in each
episode, and over 5000 Monte Carlo roll-outs. Fig. 4 shows
that, for Q2x the proposed LPPM obtained through deep RL
leaks much less information than the myopic LPPM for the
same distortion level, indicating the benefits of considering
all the history when taking actions at each time instant. This
difference is less for Q1x, since the temporal correlations
in the location history is much less than Q2x. Finally, both
proposed and myopic LPPMs performances are the same for
Q0x, since the user movement with uniform distribution does
not have temporal memory, and therefore, taking the history
into account does not help.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the privacy-utility trade-off in LPPMs using
mutual information as a privacy measure. Having identified
some properties of the optimal policy, we recast the problem
as an MDP. Due to continuous state and action spaces, it is
challenging to characterize or even numerically compute the
optimal policy. We overcome this difficulty by employing ad-
vantage actor-critic deep RL as a computational tool. Utilizing
DNNs, we numerically evaluated the privacy-utility trade-off
curve of the proposed location release policy. We compared
the results with a myopic LPPM, and observed the effect
of considering temporal correlations on information leakage-
distortion performance. According to the simulation results,
we have seen that the proposed LPPM policy provides sig-
nificant privacy advantage, especially when the user trajectory
has higher temporal correlations.
REFERENCES
[1] V. Primault, A. Boutet, S. B. Mokhtar, and L. Brunie., “The long road
to computational location privacy: A survey,” IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 2772–2793, Oct. 2018.
[2] C.-Y. Chow and M. F. Mokbel, “Trajectory privacy in location-based
services and data publication,” SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 13, pp. 19–
29, Aug. 2011.
[3] K. P. N. Puttaswamy, S. Wang, T. Steinbauer, D. Agrawal, A. E. Abbadi,
C. Kruegel, and B. Y. Zhao, “Preserving location privacy in geosocial
applications,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 13, no. 1,
pp. 159–173, Jan 2014.
[4] R. Shokri, C. Troncoso, C. Diaz, J. Freudiger, and J.-P. Hubaux,
“Unraveling an old cloak: k-anonymity for location privacy,” in ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Sep. 2010.
[5] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, C. Troncoso, J.-P. Hubaux, and J.-Y.
Le Boudec, “Protecting location privacy: Optimal strategy against local-
ization attacks,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Oct. 2012, pp. 617–627.
[6] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, and M. J. Wainwright, “Local privacy
and statistical minimax rates,” in IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, Oct 2013, pp. 429–438.
[7] W. Zhang, M. Li, R. Tandon, and H. Li, “Online location trace privacy:
An information theoretic approach,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 235–250, Jan 2019.
[8] V. Bindschaedler and R. Shokri, “Synthesizing plausible privacy-
preserving location traces,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP), May 2016, pp. 546–563.
[9] W. Luo, Y. Lu, D. Zhao, and H. Jiang, “On location and trace privacy of
the moving object using the negative survey,” IEEE Trans. on Emerging
Topics in Comput. Intelligence, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 125–134, April 2017.
[10] J. Hua, W. Tong, F. Xu, and S. Zhong, “A geo-indistinguishable location
perturbation mechanism for location-based services supporting frequent
queries,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 1155–1168, May 2018.
[11] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, J. Le Boudec, and J. Hubaux, “Quan-
tifying location privacy,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
May 2011, pp. 247–262.
[12] I. Wagner and D. Eckhoff, “Technical privacy metrics: A systematic
survey,” ACM Comput. Surv., vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 57:1–57:38, Jun. 2018.
[13] S. Li, A. Khisti, and A. Mahajan, “Information-theoretic privacy for
smart metering systems with a rechargeable battery,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 3679–3695, May 2018.
[14] G. Giaconi and D. Gu¨ndu¨z, “Smart meter privacy with renewable energy
and a finite capacity battery,” in IEEE Int. Workshop on Sig. Proc.
Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC), July 2016, pp. 1–5.
[15] E. Erdemir, P. L. Dragotti, and D. Gu¨ndu¨z, “Privacy-cost trade-off in a
smart meter system with a renewable energy source and a rechargeable
battery,” in IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), Brighton, UK, May 2019, pp. 2687–2691.
[16] C. H. Papadimitriou and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “The complexity of markov
decision processes,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 12, no. 3,
pp. 441–450, 1987.
[17] N. Saldi, T. Linder, and S. Yu¨ksel, Approximations for Partially Ob-
served Markov Decision Processes. Cham: Springer International
Publishing, 2018, pp. 99–123.
[18] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction,
2nd ed. The MIT Press, 2018.
[19] D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. II,
3rd ed. Athena Scientific, 2007.
[20] V. R. Konda and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “On actor-critic algorithms,” SIAM J.
Control Optim., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 1143–1166, Apr. 2003.
[21] I. Grondman, L. Busoniu, G. A. D. Lopes, and R. Babuska, “A
survey of actor-critic reinforcement learning: Standard and natural policy
gradients,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part
C (Applications and Reviews), vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 1291–1307, Nov 2012.
[22] D. P. Kingma and J. Ba, “Adam: A method for stochastic optimization,”
CoRR, vol. abs/1412.6980, 2015.
[23] A. L. Maas, A. Y. Hannun, and A. Y. Ng, “Rectifier nonlinearities
improve neural network acoustic models,” in ICML Workshop on Deep
Learning for Audio, Speech and Language Processing, 2013.
